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Abstract
The article is introducing the concept of efficient and fair
(just) taxation and its effect on the economy, while it also dis-
cusses it why it is difficult to reach an optimal tax system in
Hungary. In the subsequent sections, several seemingly arbi-
trarily chosen types of taxes are introduced, in order to show
how they can be used to create or to contribute to an optimal tax
system. In addition, the article describes it shortly, either why
they are not working properly at the moment or when they were
discussed or introduced in the past, what kinds of mistakes oc-
curred or mismanagement happened. The article discusses the
following taxes: royalties due to state, property tax, estate duty
(inheritance tax).
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In an ideal world there is no taxation, while in an ideal econ-
omy, built on the principal of maximum efficiency, the govern-
ment or state interferes minimally into the operations of the pri-
vate businesses and individuals. The extent of state organiza-
tions (including state administration, schools, hospitals etc) and
state property is limited only to providing real public goods, in
which any other case the private ownership would lead to a mar-
ket failure. Given the limited distribution function of the state,
we must also assume a very much restricted revenue side of the
state budget. In the above described ideal economy the classi-
cal requirements from a tax system – efficiency and fairness –
would be satisfied. In case of a limited distribution function, the
revenues collected by taxation needed to be also minimal and as
such no major interference and influence would be imposed in
the behaviour of the economic players.
According to the efficiency (neutrality) criteria, taxes should
distort the behaviour and decisions of economic players as little
as possible. A completely inactive state intervenes in the econ-
omy by its existence and unequally influences the distribution of
social benefits and social burdens. In case of the tax systems of
the modern state, which performs economic functions and which
are often regarded as attractive, it is very difficult to find aspects
of efficiency in their direct form and even in their indirect form
hard to identify. However, evaluation of their impact is further
complicated, as taxes are incorporated into the decision-making
systems of economic participants - producers and consumers –
motivating all actor to optimise tax.
Fairness (just/equal distribution of public expenses according
to the marginal capacity of economic agents) would prevail, if
two taxpayers of the same financial position prior to taxation
would remain in the same position after taxation as well. How-
ever, we should not have many illusions in relation to this crite-
rion either. According to one of the major arguments there is a
limit on the progression of tax rates as even the highest earning
entities should be motivated to increase either their income and
to fully declare it. Based on the above, the basic principle of
modern taxation can be defined, according to which the number
of tax payers must be as large as possible covering all parts of
society, including the lowest income classes.
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In the real world, which is neither ideal nor optimal, govern-
ments are happily and willingly exaggerating their interference
into the private economy and taxation is among their main tools.
At the moment in Hungary, the above described ideal minimal
state is non-existing and paradoxically one of the main reasons
(apart from actual political considerations) was the privatization
process itself. In the last 20 years – during the re-privatization of
the previous “socialist ownership”, when basically a large pro-
portion of the assets of the country were redistributed to private
entrepreneurs – the actual governments made some very serious
and not always optimal decisions.
Given the difficulties to define a measurement on alternative
privatization strategies, it is not in the scope of the Article to
examine the optimization of the whole process in full extent.
Nevertheless, the article would like to give some examples how,
with the application of a well designed taxation system, some
of the inefficient privatization decisions could be partially off-
set and some of the profit earned arising from the imbalance in
between short term funding needs versus long term utility of the
country, could be repatriated to the tax payers.
1 The present
The global crisis hit Hungarian society in the autumn of 2008
– finding a substantial segment of it in a rather weakened con-
dition. Following the transition, members of society, who had
earlier been deprived of many things, desired to obtain a larger
home, a weekend house, travelling, modern cars all at the same
time– generally speaking, the very fast imitative following of
the Western (American) model of consumption. The income
position of a not insignificant part of society did not enable this;
hence they ran heavily into debt. The crisis was tough in tak-
ing its victims from the social strata which otherwise moder-
ately drew in external (bank) funds to finance their consump-
tion; those becoming unemployed and families with only a sin-
gle wage-earner very frequently landed in a debt trap. The crisis
threw light on a great many things, illusions vanished in a mo-
ment. Naturally, belief in ongoing growth and individual life
strategies built on it became the first victims. It became evident
that not even real estate is a safe harbour as it does not maintain
its value, and the savings of many years and decades invested in
real property lost their value overnight – there is no demand for
homes and houses even at low prices. As a self-reinforcing pro-
cess, the crisis impaired the prospects even of families on which
it had no direct impact. The curbing of consumption became
the social norm as against the earlier consumption orientation.
At an individual level, the thumb rule became to wait and see
until economic growth is stabilised and the rate of employment
improves in a lasting and perceptible manner. At a social level,
however, only with a vigorously growing global economy or at
least main export markets can economic growth be envisaged
in the absence of internal, national growth of consumption, and
in Europe it would do no harm if this was supported by grow-
ing domestic consumption. In the autumn of 2010, when taking
stock of the magnitude of economic growth in Europe, it can-
not always be decided whether the cross bar is really quivering,
or it only seems to do so to us. There is no doubt that Europe
drives Hungary’s growth – to the extent that Europe is capable
of, without a sustained rise in domestic consumption.
In the period between the transition and the global crisis, large
estates were accumulated in Hungary. The large-scale privatisa-
tion cases were always results of individual negotiations even
if they were put out to tender, and even more so, if the model
was developed by the management of the company to be priva-
tised. If somebody had access to a valuable piece of the common
property in the course of privatisation, it was equivalent to ob-
taining social support for the launching of his individual enrich-
ment, and subsequently, for the further accumulation of assets
that could not be replaced by any other thing.1
It is an international experience that favoured sectors are gen-
erally able to enforce their interest in political and governmental
decision-making. Hence it is not surprising that this remained
characteristic of large Hungarian companies even after market
mechanisms gained ground.
At the time of the outbreak of the crisis, it seemed for a while
that a positive outcome was possible, a new order of values
could be created if mankind or at least the societies providing
life models are bright enough and draw the lessons of the earlier
model based on over-consumption. According to the expecta-
tions of many, the new model could have focused on the conser-
vation of the natural environment. When enforcing the environ-
mental aspects, the issue of justness and fairness is equivalent
to enforcing the principle “let the polluter pay”, i.e., damage
caused to the environment should be restored by the polluter.
Now, it seems that there is not going to be any change in mod-
els, and this cannot be comforting. It is no less so if the change
in models does not take place because the crisis is not over yet,
as we are only at its beginning, or at best in the middle of it.
A characteristic of the 20th century reaching well into the be-
ginning of the next one has been the growing pace of tax cen-
tralisation and the growing ratio of taxes on income from work
(including social security contributions [12, p398]. Ecologically
oriented tax reforms link the tax receipts collected on account
of polluting the environment to the reduction of the burden on
labour – as if designating the preferred subjects of just and eq-
uitable taxation.
1 If a person was sufficiently talented, and the company privatised by him
had a valuable market profile, the company managed to produce its purchase
price in the course of a few years of operation. If the state was the seller, the
purchase price was always substantially below what it could have been. (This is
indirectly substantiated by the transactions when the company was resold within
a short period following privatisation. Almost in every case, the on-sale prices
were higher, by orders of magnitude, than the price applied in privatisation. The
opposite case, if any, indicated individual unsuitability for managing the assets
and operating the company, etc., rather than tough and successful bargaining by
the state.) The new owner took out credits always with the new acquisition as
security. He could do so as he had obtained the coverage.
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In the following, I am not going to address the general fea-
tures of the Hungarian system of taxation, not even to the point
of introducing the problem. I shall deal only with a few kinds of
taxes, which, if applied by the government, the Hungarian sys-
tem of taxation would be more just and more equitable for the
majority of society carrying the tax volume.
2 Tax for companies – royalties
The state is entitled to land use and mining royalties on the
utilisation of arable land for other (industrial, communal) pur-
poses, and the raw materials and energy carriers brought up to
the surface. The Hungarian government waives not only these
natural royalties, but at times, as in the case of electricity gener-
ated by the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, generates a royalty of a
financial nature (dotation) for the other power plants. At other
times (Robin Hood tax, the special tax on the energy sector),
taxes of an amount substantially below the amount of the natural
or ordinary monopoly royalties undoubtedly due to the state are
imposed for a transitory period of two or three years, provoking
reactions from those concerned and the intellectuals moulding
public opinion with a vehemence depending on party sympa-
thies. Generally, as in the case of solutions that are not clean-cut,
the trap here, too, is that the roles are reversed: payment of these
transitory taxes appears as sacrifice on the part of the eternally
favoured, while the regular transfer of the royalties generated by
them in the absence of extensive individual bargains to the state,
should be part of the ordinary course of business.
The privatisation of the energy sector generally lacked a pro-
fessional concept by the government. The result is well-known:
either the company developed its own privatisation model or, as
it happened in the case of power plants and electricity providers,
competing groups of foreign trade investors, the “buyers of con-
tinental influence” [13] divided the Hungarian electricity mar-
ket among themselves with state assistance in the mid-1990s.
The government2 not only made it easy for them to acquire
markets, but even guaranteed an eight percent return on assets
(subsequently raised to ten percent). In the interest of privati-
sation revenues totalling a billion dollars, the government ceded
the mining royalties generated year-after-year constituting sta-
ble revenue for the community to them.
According to experts in environment protection, virtually ev-
ery segment of the energy sector is characterised by the reali-
sation of high extra profits and royalties; cross-financing is also
typical. The royalty, the extra income are consequences of their
monopoly positions. The members of the Levego˝ Munkacsoport
2 “At the time of the Horn government ‘the new government escaped from
the monster of empty state coffers and the threat of the IMF (the World Bank
would block the standby reserves of the country) by quickly selling the power
stations and the electricity providers. ... the revenue of one billion dollars gen-
erated by this transaction was then regarded as extraordinarily high ... a genuine
assessment of the condition of the assets has not taken place, similarly, nobody
examined the damage to the environment caused till then in any depth. ... en-
ergy policy was essentially shaped from ÁPV Rt.’ ” [13] (M. Szabó, 2006)
(Highlighted by B.A.)
[Clean Air Action Group], who developed a complex eco-social
reform of public finances in 2008[6] quantified the royalties gen-
erated in the electricity, natural gas, crude oil and the Hungarian
hydrocarbon sector in general, and retained within these sectors
in other works [9]. Below, I restrict myself to the presentation of
those royalty items only in the case of which interrelations are
self-evident requiring no additional explanation3:
• MOL buys crude oil at the lower Ural (Med) price, yet it
applies the higher Mediterranean (Brend) prices as the price
base in calculating the domestic prices of petroleum products;
the amount of the extra profit realised by the company in this
way amounts to HUF 20 billion a year;
• cheap electricity produced by the Paks Nuclear Power Plant
which in the hands of the state creates extra profit – hidden
subsidy – at the power plants; the amount thus distributed
among the power plants totalled HUF 100 billion in 2007
[6]. The profits of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant (to put it
more accurately, the price of electricity generated by it) was
reduced by the eight, and subsequently ten percent return on
assets guaranteed for the power plants as early as in 2006, and
also thereafter when the state’s obligation to do so no longer
obtained;
The major outflow of profits can be substantiated also by an
EU comparison. In Hungary, the price of electricity sold to
households was 7.7 percent higher than the average price in the
European Union. Taking into account purchasing power pari-
ties, prices (more accurately purchasing units) were the high-
est here, exceeding the incidentally lowest French prices (pur-
chasing units) more than twofold. “... the difference between
the price for Hungarian households on 1 August 2009 (0.1605
euro/kWh) and the transfer price of 0.040 euro/kWh of Paks was
about fourfold” [9, p10].
Buyers paid a total of one billion dollars for the Hungarian
electricity market in the mid-1990s – this is hardly twice the
amount of the 2007 royalties regrouped at the Paks Nuclear
Power Plant and left with the companies instead of being col-
lected by the state.
• the mining royalty on hydro-carbons, whose amount should
be due to general government is the difference between the
local cost of production and world market prices. In 2008,
“MOL paid HUF 115 billion to the budget” on the production
of crude oil and natural gas instead of the HUF 276 billion
generated. In that same year, the amount of the mining royalty
realised by coalmining as extra profit was HUF 10 billion4
[9, p12].
3 I highlight only the energy sector and not even that in full from the proposal
of the Levego˝ Munkacsoport (CAAG), and another study of the authors on the
domestic subsidisation of fossil energy.
4 The basis of the mining royalty is termed as the “generated value” of the
mineral raw material. Its rate is 12 percent in the case of crude oil and natural
gas, 5 percent in the case of non-metallic mineral raw materials and 2 percent in
the case of other solid mineral raw materials and exploited geothermal energy.
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• The price of electricity purchased from the Ukraine is 33 per-
cent lower than the world market price. In the absence of
competition, a few electricity traders share the difference. At
least half the foreign trade royalty generated is due to the
state; in 2006 this amounted to HUF 23 billion [9, p14].
The highlighted items quantified for one of the years between
2006 and 2008 alone together correspond to 35 percent of the
budget deficit of HUF 870 billion planned for 2010, and 16.2
percent of the planned revenues from personal income tax (HUF
1,881 billion) (Bill on the 2010 Budget).
3 A contemporary solution for municipalities – Prop-
erty tax
It cannot be regarded as fortuitous that all Hungarian govern-
ments (finance ministers) of the past one-and-a-half decades –
with the exception of the one in power for the past few months
– attempted to make property tax mandatory and value-based.5
There is no uniform and value-based property taxation in Hun-
gary6, yet I believe it could hardly be supposed that this state of
affairs could be maintained in the medium-term. And that is so
not only because property tax is suitable for channelling hidden
incomes back into sharing the public burden, but also because it
has somewhat of a wide range as a tax base, and property is a tax
base that cannot be carried offshore – and other exemplary coun-
tries pursue uniform and value-based property taxation without
exception.
International experience proves that property tax is generally
one of the least accepted kinds of tax,7 but a fair consensus can
No mining royalty needs to be paid on crude oil produced using increased effi-
ciency procedures. The rate of the royalty can be reduced for reasons of public
interest. In the case of mining activities exercised on the basis of concession
contracts, the minister establishes the rate of the mining royal individually.
5 It is since 1991 (Act C of 1990) that Hungarian municipalities are autho-
rised to decide independently whether or not to impose local taxes on the popu-
lation living in their settlement, the local undertakings or the possible objects of
taxation and if so, whether they wish to impose all of the local taxes without fail,
or only in part, or not at all. Municipalities are authorised to deviate downwards
from the centrally maximised tax rates at their discretion, but not upwards. The
absence of the mandatory nature of local taxes counts as a curiosity even in
international practice.
Typically, municipalities impose property tax on the basis of area (max. HUF
900 /m˛/year) – in recent years, they have frequently imposed property tax on
household property also. Earlier they tended to impose the tax on non-housing
property.
In the case of a value-based tax, the valuation of real property and the main-
tenance of such values requires a large staff of well-qualified experts, as well
as the accurate documentation and administration of the data of the individual
properties (or at least of the districts or value zones, which can be regarded as
having the same attributes). In Hungary and in the former socialist countries,
area-based property tax is characteristic because data available from the land
registry are sufficient for this.
6 In 2009, the property tax proposed by the Bajnai government (and adopted
by Parliament) was annulled by the Constitutional Court.
7 Property tax is a visible tax, because (in contrast to turnover tax built into
prices, or income tax, which is deducted), it is paid by the taxpayer and it can be
be developed along principles that can be well delineated. These
principles are the following:
• practically the entire profession agrees that what is desirable
is a tax base as wide as possible and a tax rate as low as
possible, that is, it would be expedient to make the imposi-
tion of a mandatory, uniform and value-based property tax of
around 0.2 percent on any property within the confines of a
municipality irrespective of the purpose of utilisation;8
• a property tax paid on housing property deductible from per-
sonal income tax, and property tax on commercial property
deductible from the local industry tax is largely regarded as
equitable;
• it is necessary to clearly define the range of exemptions, the
circle of those exempt from the obligation to pay the tax (low
income people, large families, pensioners);
• the database requirement of the method of valuation chosen
cannot be excessive, and first and foremost, it must not violate
the sensitivity and personal rights of the citizens;
• property tax is largely a local tax, or shared (central and local)
tax – irrespective of whether it is collected by local govern-
ments or the central (regional) tax administration. Generally,
the latter is more suitable for this task.
The point of departure of the tax introduced as of January 1,
2010, was populist (property tax = luxury tax). The so-called
property tax (or asset tax) applied to real property and means
of transportation (road vehicles, vessels and means of air trans-
portation) above a certain value limit. This value-based property
tax should not have been paid on all real property, but hous-
ing property in excess of a market value (or rather calculated
value) of HUF 30 million, and its amount was not deductible
from personal income tax. This tax would have affected only
about 200,000-250,000 of the 4.2 million housing properties in
Hungary.
In an international comparison, the value of privately held
housing property in Hungary is substantially more significant
than what would follow from the living standards and income
relations of the households. The desire of the people for a home
of their own, and their ties to it is not typical in an international
comparison, this explains the frequently excessive burden un-
dertaken to buy the first home, and then subsequently more valu-
able homes. A home with a market value of thirty or even forty
million forints does not belong to the luxury category even in
both advantageous and disadvantageous. It is disadvantageous because knowl-
edge of the amount of the tax may increase the resistance among taxpayers to
the tax. For the same reason, it may be, or it could be, favourable because it
could direct the attention of the taxpayer to the service provided in exchange for
the tax, demanding that account be given for the use of the tax paid.
8 Property below the value of HUF 2 million is normally excluded from
the range of taxable property for rational reasons as in their case, the cost of
collecting the tax exceeds the amount of the tax collected.
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Budapest, and definitely not outside Budapest, and their source
is characteristically income from work (that is taxed income),
hence insisting on the principle of “let the rich pay” against their
owners is, in most cases, not only unjust but also untrue.
Prior to and even independent of the introduction of the uni-
form property tax, it would be expedient to impose a property
tax precisely on the largest industrial and commercial proper-
ties with a mandatory nature in accordance with international
practice at a rate higher than that usually applied to housing
property, as a central tax or at most, a tax shared withmunicipal-
ities. There is every reason to reduce the increasing differences
between settlements associated precisely with the differences in
the number and economic potential of companies operating at
the individual settlements. The separate handling and target-
oriented utilisation of the part of the property tax proposed on
non-housing property to be absorbed by the central budget offers
an opportunity for this.
Presumably, the ecological footprint of these large industrial
and commercial estates is a multiple of that of a smaller settle-
ment and is not restricted to the given settlement, but gives rise
to changes in a substantially larger area. With regard to commer-
cial property, this circle includes the shopping centres and the
logistics centres of commercial networks. The implementation
and operation of the major industrial and commercial properties
required the construction of parking lots, roads leading there,
that is, the covering of large areas. It is well-known that this has
a detrimental impact on the water balance and flora and fauna
of the soil, as well as the local climate. Produce get polluted by
materials detrimental to health in a wide band along roads. For
this reason, there is all the justification for breaking the pace of
greenfield investments, instead the so-called rusty zones already
interfered with should be preferred.
In 1950, the share of areas withdrawn from agricultural culti-
vation did not reach eight percent of the territory of the country,
and it made up no more than 11.5 percent even in 1990, which
is the year of the transition. Between 2000 and 2006, it seemed
that this share was stabilising at a relatively high level of 17 per-
cent, but the 16.4 percent of 2009 indicated some improvement.
Close to one-fifth of the areas withdrawn from agricultural cul-
tivation (19 percent) is re-categorisation as internal area, and the
reason for this is almost exclusively the construction of indus-
trial and commercial properties, shopping centres and, naturally,
large housing estates. The appreciation of the Budapest agglom-
eration area is indicated by the fact that 24 percent of the nation-
wide figure for inclusion in internal areas is attributed to Pest
county. (Withdrawal from agricultural production to the largest
extent is in any case characteristic of this county, but this figure
is only 14 percent of the nationwide.) (CSO)
A non-recurrent land protection allowance is payable in the
event of utilising arable land for other purposes. Although the
least possible size of area can and should be used for purposes
other than agriculture according to Act CXXIX of 2007, every-
day practice (large parking lots and/or warehouses beside the
facilities; shopping centres of at most two or three levels, etc.)
does not indicate full compliance with the law. It seems, for
potential investors weighing their decisions, the quality of the
arable land to be used is not a priority aspect. In the case of
arable land of a quality better than the average, the allowance
payment obligation substantially higher than before still fails to
exert a substantially restrictive impact.
A thorough analysis of expected environmental impact must
(should) be a necessary part of the licensing process, preced-
ing the establishment of new industrial and commercial proper-
ties. At the same time, the damage and other environmental im-
pact caused by already operational properties should definitely
be modelled prior to determining the tax rate.
The genuine value of industrial and commercial properties is
obscure, while they should be individually determined for spec-
ifying the tax base at all times. These figures are not avail-
able in any registry, as it is not the properties themselves, but
their owner companies that are the subjects of sale and purchase
transactions.
A property tax imposed mandatorily on large industrial and
commercial properties on a value basis would substantially re-
duce the possibilities of bargaining with the local governments,
which is undesirable from the viewpoint of society as a whole.
In the case of the local industry tax, so much favoured by local
governments and companies and undertakings with a view to
attracting a large company (relocation of its seat), local govern-
ments readily employ preferential rates (of even zero percent).
The total freedom guaranteed for Hungarian local govern-
ments with regard to the application of local taxation has a num-
ber of negative consequences, of which perhaps the most severe
is that it restricts the coming into being of modern local gover-
nance, particularly at the settlements having bodies of represen-
tatives that are more patriotic than what could be expected.
4 Closing the generation income gap – Estate duty
As discussed above, a socially just and equitable property tax
is one, where the tax paid on housing property originating from
income from work is deductible from personal income tax. A
similar expectation can be formulated in the case of estate duty
and the duty on presents resulting in a rearrangement of assets
between generations: the tax exemption of inheritance stem-
ming from income from work (the predominant share of which
is housing property in Hungary today) can be regarded as so-
cially just and equitable pointing towards equality of opportu-
nity, while the uniform taxation of large estates manifested in
various assets, which stem from incomes other than from work
(business quotas, shares, bonds, real estate) can be considered
similarly to the value-based taxation of large industrial and com-
mercial property.
The progressive estate duty or tax exemption up to a relatively
substantial value of property/inheritance is a typical instrument
of reducing social inequalities. An example of the former is that
early in the 1940s “the rate of the estate duty [could reach] 80
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percent in England and France”, and at that time “the maximum
tax rate was 60 percent in Germany, and 50 percent in Italy.”9
[15, p8].
In European countries, where there is an estate duty, it is a
mix of legal solutions and tax allowances. Every Anglo-Saxon
country guarantees exemption based on the magnitude of the
assets. The following are international examples of partial or
full exemption from estate duty:
• United States: the amount of the tax is specified in the an-
nual budget, in 2009 it was applicable to estates not exceed-
ing USD 3.5 million (roughly HUF 700 million), irrespective
of the number of heirs and the degree of kinship; 97 percent
of Americans belong to this category;
• England: in 2009, GBP 312,000, the basis of determining the
value is the price of an average house in London;
• Germany: EUR 307,000 for spouses and EUR 205,000 /
capita in the case of children;
• France: spouses/life companions do not pay this duty at all,
in the case of children it is EUR 156,000 / capita;
• Italy: EUR 1 million for every close relative;
• the Netherlands: in the case of spouses, in excess of half a
million euro, for children it depends on age;
• Czech Republic: full exemption in the case of spouses and
children (Dr. Spielmann).
Currently, there is no estate duty in Sweden, Slovakia and (since
2008) Austria, Egypt, Israel and Australia. (Dr. Spielmann)
The abolition of the estate duty means that the parts of as-
sets generated in the course of privatisation in Hungary exceed-
ing HUF 20 million have been removed from bearing the public
burden, that is, this gate to ensuring the equality of opportunity
has also been shut. Historically, it would have been the time
for exactly the opposite: while substantially raising the HUF 20
million limits for tax exemption, these assets should have been
taxed at a more progressive rate than before. The wealthier part
of society had it easy to avoid estate duty; its abolition may seem
like just and equitable. In Hungary, there are practically no as-
sets left to be privatized, and in the future, the redistribution of
assets and the network formation of large private companies can
be expected. Large Hungarian companies entering the interna-
tional scene continue to need the parent country because owing
to domestic references, they cannot even dream of a global eco-
nomic role. This would require the exemption of those living
off income from work in Hungary, and an improvement in the
chances of the next generations – that is, the coming into being
of the richest circle of owners, who recognise mutual interde-
pendence and elevate it to the norm.
9 A radical increase in estate duty “has for long been urged by folkist writers
and progressive middle-class democrats, such as the writer Sándor Márai.” [15,
p8]
5 Summary
The article attempted to reveal the connection in between the
recent past (since the transition of the early 90’s) of the Hungar-
ian society, economy and the ecology and some discretionary
selected type of taxes. The aim was to show that with appro-
priately chosen taxes, some of the social, economical and even
more importantly ecological inequalities created by the individ-
ual bargaining power of certain economic entities during the
privatization process and the subsequent economic development
can be remedied. Also, the same can be said about the redistri-
bution of equity or wealth among generations, which was a more
politically driven decision, very strongly supported and lobbied
by the winners of the privatization process. In addition, another
important aspect was to prove that the proper selection of taxes
and their appropriate utilization can lead to an efficient and fair
taxation.
As it is seen in the article, by selecting a certain type of taxes
solely for populist purposes can even further deteriorate the situ-
ation (e.g.: property tax). To make it even worse, due to negative
publicity/communication, it can completely block the use of the
given tax instrument for an extended period of time, even if it
would be an appropriate choice of type of tax. Of course, the
above holds true only if all the parameters of the selected type
of tax – tax rate, tax payers, monitoring and controlling of the
tax declarations and the underlying activity or property – are se-
lected properly.
One of the basic assumptions of the article was that all type
of taxes should be levied on the widest available number of tax
payers. By this way, it can be ensured that, while the individual
tax rate will be relatively low, the people and the companies will
not feel that they are severely and unilaterally punished. Rather
by this way, it can be the proof of solidarity, that they are all
part of the society and it is their civil obligation to contribute to
its functions. It is even truer in case of ecological/environmental
issues and to remedy and prevent the damages by taxes, as in this
case an instrument which is either also belongs to a larger part
of the society or to another generation is to be taxed to counter-
balance the externalities and inefficiencies (see local industrial
and commercial taxes).
In the future, given the deterioration of our natural environ-
ment there will be a growing need to develop new type of taxes
especially aimed to prevent further damages in the natural and
built habitat and to increase our awareness in order not to over-
consume what is in the possession of the local community (both
micro and macro-level) and ultimately the human kind.
The most important aspect of taxation or any individual type
of tax is that, it is an economic tool and as such before any de-
cision of levying a new type of tax or to change substantially
the existing system a full-scale micro and macro analysis has
to be done and even more importantly can be done. The use
of taxation to the purpose of only serving momentarily populist
and political goals can cause just long term and very expensive
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problems for the whole society.
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